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Case Analysis
IMMIGRATION AND NA TURALIZA TION SER VICE v.
STEVIC STANDARDS OF PROOF IN REFUGEE CASES
INVOLVING POLITICAL ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION
AlR.UR C. HELTON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian concerns for the plight of refugees have caused the United States
to make several provisions for them.! The Refugee Act of 19802 established a provision for asylum with the possibility of a durable solution in the form of permanent residence. 3 Refugees in the United States also have a right to protection
against return to countries in which they would be persecuted.' Issues relating to
the standard of proof of persecution necessary under the 1980 Act have only recently
been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic5
This article discusses both the holding and scope of the Stevic decision, and
identifies the issues left open for further resolution. This analysis reviews prior
law, and analyzes the Stevic decision in light of that background. Finally, this article discusses lower court decisions applying Stevic and the implications of those cases.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pedrag Stevic is a Yugoslavian citizen who entered the United States in June
1976 to visit his American sister. Stevic overstayed his temporary visa. The Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted deportation proceedings against him,
and he admitted to being deportable and agreed to leave voluntarily by February
1977.6 Prior to that date, however, Stevic married a United States citizen who petitioned for a new visa on Stevic's behalf. When his wife died in an automobile
accident shortly thereafter, Stevic's petition was automatically revoked, and he was
ordered to surrender for deportation to Yugoslavia.7
In August 1977 Stevic moved to reopen the deportation proceedings, seeking
relief under Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act," which at that
*Director of the Political Asylum Project of the Lawyers Committee for International Human
Rights in New York City. J.D., New York University, 1976.
1 Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980,
19 SAN DinGo L. REv. 9 (1981).
2 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Act].
3 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982).
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970 & Supp. 1984).
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984).
Id. at 2490.

Id. at 2490-91.
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
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time provided that the Attorney General could withhold deportation of an alien
upon a finding that the alien would be subject to persecution based on his political
opinion.9 Stevic based his claim on his activities in the United States as a member
of an anticommunist organization, claiming that his father-in-law had been
imprisoned in Yugoslavia because of membership in the same organization. Stevic
stated that he also feared such imprisonment.'0 In October 1979, the immigration
judge denied Stevic's motion to reopen, and the denial was upheld by the Board
of Immigration Appeals on the ground that Stevic had not presented prima facie
evidence proving that there was "a clear probability of persecution" to be directed
at Stevic." Stevic did not seek judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals
decision. '2

After Stevic received notice to surrender for deportation in February 1981, he
again sought relief under Section 243(h), which had been amended by the Refugee
Act of 1980.'1 The immigration judge applied the same standards as had been applied
in 1979, holding that although Stevic submitted additional evidence, he had not
shown the evidence had been unavailable at the time his first motion was filed.
The judge further held that Stevic had once more failed to show there was a "clear
probability of [his] persecution."'' 4 Stevic's motion to reopen was again denied,
and the Board of Immigration Appeals again upheld the denial.'"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remanded the case for a plenary
hearing under a different standard of proof.' 6 The circuit court examined the
legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 and concluded that Congress had

at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1952 Act].
The text of the statute provided in pertinent part:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United
States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to
be necessary for such reason.
Id. at § 1253(h).
Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2491.
Id.
12

Id.

'

The text of the statute provided:

The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
1980 Act, supra note 2, at § 1253(h)(1).
'4 Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 1291.
Id.
I at 1292.
Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom, INS v. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. 1289
(1984). See Comment, Eligibilityfor Withholding of Deportation:The Alien's Burden Under the 1980
Refugee Act, 49 BRooKLYN L. REv. 1193 (1983).
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intended to abandon the "clear probability of persecution" standard, and substitute
the more generous "well-founded fear of persecution" standard, which would be
consistent with the definition of refugee contained in a United Nations Protocol.' 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second
Circuit's decision. Noting that the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard
applied only to a request for discretionary asylum, the Court held that an alien
must establish a clear probability of persecution to avoid deportation under Section
243(h).' 8
III.

PIUoR

LAw

For the purposes of examining the Stevic decision, the history of the law governing asylum for and the withholding of deportation of refugees may be divided into
roughly four periods: First, the period prior to 1968, when the United States became
a party to the United Nations Protocol;1 9 Second, the period after accession, when
the Protocol was applied and interpreted; Third, the period in which changes to
the law were proposed; and Fourth, the enactment of those changes in the Refugee
Act of 1980.
A.

Pre-1968 Asylum Law

Before 1968, there were three procedures under which aliens could seek refuge
in the United States. Each procedure had its own standard.
1. Withholding of Deportation
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Attorney General was
authorized to "withhold deportation of any alien .. to any country in which
in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution." 2 Faced with
this discretionary authority to decline to deport an alien from the United States,
a limiting principle was developed to restrict the "favorable exercise of ... discretion to cases of clear probability of persecution of the particular individual
petitioner." 2'
17

Sava, 678 F.2d at 409.

Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 1292.
The United States became a party to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
the Refugees in 1968, see infra note 32. The Protocol has the legal status of a treaty, because it both
incorporates and supplements the substantive provisions of the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. The Board of Immigration Appeals applies the Protocol as it would an Act of Congress.
See In re Dunar, 14 1. & N. Dec. 210 (1973). See also Griffith, Deportationand the Refugee, in TRA sNA'9

TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGFES, 125 (Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies 1982).

1952 Act, supra note 8, at § 1101.
2' In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72, 73 (1968) [citation omitted]; In re Tan, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 564, 568 (1967); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967). The decisions of the Board
of Immigration Appeals cited in this article, unless otherwise indicated, have been designated as precedents.
8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1984).
20
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This "clear probability" standard was applied stringently. In one case, for
example, withholding was denied to an ethnic Chinese applicant despite voluminous
documentation of abuse of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, letters from relatives and
an attack on the family business.2 2 In another, an Iranian president of an antiShah student organization was denied withholding despite findings that the alien
was "prominently involved" in political activities in the United States and that
it was likely he had been so identified by the government of Iran.21 More recently,
a federal district court found evidence of systematic and extensive persecution in
numerous Haitian cases, yet not one applicant had met the "clear probability"
standard. These applicants included one woman whose father had been killed by
the Ton Ton Macoutes, who had attempted to apprehend her just after she fled.
Another applicant had been jailed after the murder of both her husband and her
24
son.

The Attorney General's application of this standard was reviewable only for
abuse of discretion, a difficult standard to meet. Even where "the Attorney General's
course of conduct show[ed] consistency in the various cases," his ungenerous interpretation of the law in a single case was deemed insufficient cause to hold that
he had exercised his discretion in an arbitrary manner.25
2.

Conditional Entry Status

Conditional entry was established in 1965 and concerned the admission of
refugees from overseas.2 6 The Immigration and Naturalization Service could grant
this status to aliens
who satisf[ied] an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer at an examination in any non-Communist or non-Communist-dominated country, (A) that (i)
because of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they [had]
fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II)
from any country in the Middle East, and (ii) [were] unable or unwilling to return
to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (iii)
[were] not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry [was] made .... 27
A numerical ceiling was placed on admissions, and relief was strictly limited by
the ideology and geographic location of the applicant. Judicial review was ordinarily

22 Tan,

12 I. & N. Dec. at 68.
In re Kojoory, 12 1. & N. Dec. 215, 217 (1967).
24 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom.
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
23

11 Lena, 379 F.2d at 538.

26 Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 913 repealed by 94 Stat. 107 [hereinafter cited as 1965
Amendments].
2 Id. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.9 (1984) (which limits the countries in which conditional entry visas
could be processed to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and Lebanon). 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss4/6
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precluded, since most of the eligibility determinations were made abroad."8 While
the precedents are sparse, it is apparent that29the conditional entry standard was
standard.

more lenient than the withholding

3. Attorney General Parole Power
In 1952, the Attorney General was granted authority, to "parole"

aliens

temporarily into the country "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly

in the public interest." 3 This parole power was also used to admit refugees from
overseas. In contrast to conditional entry, there were no numerical limitations. Unlike
withholding, there were no ideological or geographical limitations. In practice,
however, the parole power was used almost exclusively to admit those fleeing
3
communism. '

B.

1968: The United Nations Protocol
In 1968 the United States became a party to the 1967 United Nations Protocol

Relating to the Status of Refugees. 32 The United States thereby adopted the provi-

sions of the Protocol, which defines the term "refugee" as a person who:
28 The only reported cases prior to 1968 are: In re Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201 (1967) (Polish

visitor); In re Lalian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 125 (1967) (Iranian visitor); In re Frisch, 12 I. & N. Dec. 40
(1967) (Yugoslavian student).
29 See Cheng Fu Sheng v. Barber, 269 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1959) (construing the term "fear
of persecution" in the unrelated Refugee Relief Act of 1953 as "in sharp contrast" to the stringent
withholding of deportation provision). See also Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 569-70; Adamska, 12 I. &
N. Dec. at 202 (holding conditional entry to be "substantially broader" than the pre-1965 withholding);
In re Ugricic, 14 I. & N. Dec. 384, 385-86 (1972) (conditional entry found to require only "good reason
to fear persecution").
" 1952 Act, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. at 188 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976)).
3' World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response, Report to the Committee
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979) [hereinafter cited as World Refugee Crisis]. The
following table summarizes the pre-1968 use of the parole power.
Non-communist
Europe (1965)

Total Authorized
925

Communist
Hungary (1957)
Cuba (1960-67)
Chinese-Hong Kong (1962)
U.S.S.R. (1963)

32,000
185,487
15,000
224
232,711

Id.
32 The United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was opened for signature on
January 31, 1967. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. It was ratified by the United
States on October 4, 1968. 114 Cong. Rec. 29,607 (1968). The Protocol incorporated the pertinent
aspects of the refugee definition in article 1 and articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Disseminated
by The Research
@ WVU,
1985
Status of Refugees.
19 U.S.T. Repository
6260, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577
[hereinafter cited as Protocol].
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[o]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 3

As Justice Stevens explained in Stevic, 3 4 the sponsors of the Protocol and expert
witnesses who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were
unequivocal in their assurances that ratification of the document "would not impinge
adversely upon the federal and state laws of this country." 3 1 In particular, Eleanor
McDowell of the Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State testified
before the Foreign Relations Committee on the subject of the Protocol. She stated
that "existing regulations which have to do with deportation would permit the
Attorney General sufficient flexibility to enforce the provisions of this convention
which are not presently contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act." 3 6
However, a large gap existed between the standard theoretically contained in the
37
Protocol and the standard implemented in practice.
1.

Withholding of Deportation
The withholding of deportation provision, as amended in 1965, read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject
to persecution on account of his race, religion or political opinion and for such
38
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.

The considerable flexibility permitted under the withholding provision could have

33
14

Id. at Art. I § 2.
Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2494-95.

11 114 Cong. Rec. 29,391 (1968) (statement of Senator Mansfield); accord 114 Cong. Rec. 27,757
(1968) (Message from the President transmitting the Protocol); id. at 27,758 (letter of submittal from
the Dep't of State); 114 Cong. Rec. 27,844 (1968) (statement of Laurence Dawson of the Dep't of State).
36 S. ExEc. RE. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968).
, The failure of the Stevic Court to recognize this gap between theory and practice caused the
Court to misconstrue the full import of the 1980 Act.
1' 1965 Amendments, supra note 26, at § 3 (amending § 243(h) of the 1952 Act (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982))). Prior to 1965, an alien had to establish that he or she would be subject
to "physical persecution" to be eligible for withholding of deportation. Congress amended the withholding
provision in 1965 replacing "'physical persecution" with "persecution on account of race, religion or
political opinion." 1965 Amendments, § 11. This change was considered by Congress to be in harmony
with the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, even though the United
States had not formally acceded to the Convention. See Tan, 12 1. & N. Dec. 564.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss4/6
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accommodated the new refugee standard. However, although the Board of
Immigration Appeals purported to limit negative exercises of discretion to situa-

tions in which an alien was not eligible for withholding, 39 it retained the "clear
probability" standard."'

As Justice Stevens recognized," the courts that reviewed withholding of depor-

tation determinations after the United States became a party to the Protocol differed
refugee eligibility standard. Some used the
in their application of an appropriate
' 3
4

"well-founded fear" standard. " Others used the "clear probability" standard,
while other courts used other formulations.44

What was clear was that the courts did not agree. The Seventh Circuit stated
in 1977 that "the 'well-founded fear' standard in the Protocol and the 'clear
probability' standard which this court has engrafted onto section 243(h) will in
practice converge." 41 5 The Fifth Circuit that same year explained that the Protocol

Board, "suggest[ed] at least a slight diminution in the
standard, as viewed by the
' 46
proof.
of
alien's burden
2.

The Parole Power

The Attorney General's parole power was also sufficiently flexible to accommodate the ideologically neutral Protocol standard. In practice, however, political
ideology continued to skew decision-making. 47 Only about one percent of admis-

11Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 322 (1973). But see In re Liao, 11I. & N. Dec. 113, 117-19 (1965)
(held no abuse of administrative discretion to deny withholding of deportation despite immigration
judge's reference to "considerable evidence" to support respondent's claim of likelihood of persecution
upon return to Formosa).
, In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 72.
" Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2495 n.12.
42 Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055,
1058 (2d Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1975).
41 Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281,
1289 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); Cisternas-Estay
v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100,
102 (1st Cir. 1971).
" Khalil v. District Director, 457 F.2d 1276, 1277 n.3 (9th Cir. 1972) ("would be persecuted");
Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable persecution"); Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d
1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
920 (1971); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) ("likely" persecution); Kovac v. INS, 407
F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969) ("probability of persecution").
" Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977).
46 Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 997 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977).
" World Refugee Crisis, supra note 31, see Section III, Part A(3) for a description of the parole
power prior to 1968.
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sions were from non-communist countries.48 The admission of a few persons from

non-communist countries under the parole power, on the other hand, illustrates
that the Attorney General had the power to admit refugees regardless of ideology.4 9
C. Post-1968 Calls for Legislation

After 1968 it became increasingly apparent to legislators that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service was still using practices and procedures that frustrated
the implementation of the Protocol and that were inconsistent with its underlying
humanitarian philosophy. In recognition of the United States' leadership in showing
compassion for the persecuted, Congress called for legislation to ensure
implementation of the Protocol.
As soon as the Protocol was ratified, members of Congress realized that the
definition of refugee would have to be broadened. 50 This need for an expanded
definition was highlighted by the so-called Kurdica Affair in 1970, in which a Soviet
sailor who had jumped ship was returned to his vessel without an opportunity to
seek asylum."

" The following table in World Refugee Crisis, supra note 31, summarizes the use of the parole
power from 1968 to 1980.
Non-communist
Latin America (excluding
Cuba) (1975-78)
Uganda (1972-73)
Lebanon (1978)

Total Authorized

4,400
1,750
1,000
7,150

Communist
Cuba (1968-78)
U.S.S.R. (1970-77)
U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe (1978-79)
Czechoslovakia (1970)
Indochina (1975-79)

232,666
17,200
61,924
6,500
290,075

608,365
In 1972, the Department of State recognized that accession to the Protocol required implementing procedures and adherence to the new refugee standard. At that time, regulations were issued permitting aliens to seek sanctuary in the United States and abroad. 37 Fed. Reg. 3447 (1972). See also
39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1974) (establishing a formal asylum procedure for the INS that also recognized
the applicability of the Protocol).
" See, e.g., S. 3202, 115 Cong. Rec. 36,965-66 (1969).
" See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvicE OF THE LmERARY OF CONGRESS, RaVmW OF UNITED STATES
REFUGEE RESETrEMENT PROORAMS AND PoucIEs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980).
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Legislators introduced bills to require the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-

vice to conform its standards and practices to those of the Protocol, and the pressure
for change continued from 1973 until the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act.5 2 Bills

considered in 1976 by the House had contained the "well-founded fear" refugee
standard. 53 Indeed, this standard was the subject of most of the hearings, and it
is significant that representatives of the Departments of State and Justice recognized
the difference between the stringent "clear probability" standard and the Protocol
standard. The Justice Department, while supportive of the basic tenets of the refugee

provision believed that the "well-founded fear of persecution" should be limited
to the "well-founded fear of persecution in the opinion of the Attorney General."
The Department believed that, otherwise, the test would be entirely subjective and
left to the alien claiming refugee status to determine whether his fear of being
54
persecuted was or was not well-founded.

The refugee standard was raised specifically in hearings in 1977. Congresswoman
Holtzman, ultimately the cosponsor of the 1980 legislation, stated her concern with
the Services' narrow reading of the law:
MS. HOLTZMAN. . . .I wonder if you have any concern that ...we ought
to ... spell out-but not in an overly detailed manner-the kinds of procedures
that should be used.
The reason I raise this is because when Congress creates a statutory scheme and
does not really specify how that scheme is to be implemented it can be thwarted
by the executive branch. I am concerned because I think the definition of refugee

in this bill is an excellent one and even though it states what person will be a refugee
if he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, we don't specify how that
well-founded fear is to be ascertained. .

...1

"1 See S. 2643, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2405, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In 1973, Senator
Kennedy introduced S.2643. 119 CONG. REc. 35, 734 (1973). The definition of the term "refugee"
was patterned closely on the Protocol definition. Id. at 35,735, 37,737. That same year in the House,
very extensive hearings were held on H.R. 981. See Western Hemisphere Immigration, Hearingsbefore
House Subcomm. No. I of the Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Witnesses noted
with pleasure the usage of the Protocol terminology. Id. at 249-50, 258, 304, 306, 326; see also 119
Cong. Rec. 31,360 (1973) (statement of Rep. Eilberg introducing the bill on the House floor); 119 Cong.
Rec. 31,454-55 (1973).
In 1975, in introducing S. 2405, Senator Kennedy said:
[T]he act of 1965 was only the beginning of an important task .... It failed to resolve a
number of issues relating to immigration... It was generally recognized at the time that
additional legislation would soon be needed. And this failure to act over the past decade

has . . . been detrimental to fulfilling the intent of the 1965 Act. ..."

121 Cong. Rec. 29,947 (1975). S. 2405 specifically proposed to excise the 1965 ideological biases and
to include the U.N. refugee definition.
" See Western Hemisphere Immigration, Hearings on H.R. 367, H.R. 981, and H.R. 10323,
before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and InternationalLaw of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings].
1" Id. at 18.
" Policy and Procedurefor the Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearingson H.R.
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Congresswoman Holtzman, as a lawyer, appreciated that a stringent application
could eviscerate the most generous legislation.
In 1978, Congressman Eilberg, expressing Congress' growing impatience with
the INS' failure to fulfill the spirit of the Protocol, stated: "For years, we have
received assurances ... from the Justice Department ... that criteria, guidelines,
and regulations would be promulgated . . . so we would not have to go through
the necessity of moving legislation. Yet this has never taken place." ' , Thus, the
stage was set for comprehensive legislation.

D.

The Refugee Act of 1980

The Refugee Act of 1980 established a standard for uniform and nonideological
refugee eligibility. Congress intended this new standard to be compatible with the
humanitarian traditions and international obligations of the United States. Central
to the Act was a statutory definition of "refugee" which conformed to that of
the Protocol. A refugee was defined as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. . . .'
Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act amended the language of section 243(h),
basically conforming it to the language of Article 33 of the United Nations
Protocol." Section 243(h)(1), as amended, provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if

the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened
in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.9
Article 33(1) of the Protocol provides:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ...

a refugee in any manner whatsoever

to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
3056 Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. at 126-27 (1977) (emphasis added). H.R. 3056 is specifically
cited in the legislative history of the 1980 Act as the genesis of that law. See H.R. Rep. No. 608,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
16Admission of Refugees into the United States, II: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and InternationalLaw of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.
15 (1978).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2496.
" 1980 Act, supra note 2, at § 243(h)(1).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss4/6
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account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.1°
As the Court observed in Stevic, 6 ' the statute does not use the term "refugee."
However, Article 33, upon which it was modeled, does use the term and thereby
incorporates the refugee definition.
Furthermore, it is clear that Congress intended the definition of "refugee"
in the 1980 Act to conform to that in the Protocol.62 During hearings, the derivation of the term was often mentioned and never questioned. This intent was
emphasized in the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee and in the debate on
the Senate floor. 63 Similarly, throughout House consideration of the bill, references
were made to "the fundamental change under the legislation [which was] the replacing of the existing definition of refugee with the definition which appears in the
4
'
U.N. Convention and Protocol. ""
Congress noted that the purpose of changing the definition was not only to
excise ideological bias from the law, but also to facilitate bringing refugees into
the United States as only a well-founded fear of persecution would have to be
established. 61 Congress also emphasized its concern over the intransigence of INS
in the past and expressed its intention to monitor compliance in the future: "The
Committee intends to monitor closely the Attorney General's implementation of
' 66
the [asylum] section so as to insure the rights of those it seeks to protect.
Despite Congressional emphasis on the uniform, nonideological standard
through the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, INS continued to follow the
"clear probability" standard. 67 In one celebrated case in 1980,68 the Board denied
withholding to a defector from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) who

Protocol, supra note 32, at Art. 33(1).
Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2497.
62 See, e.g., 126 Cong. Rec. 3,757 (1980) (statement of Senator Kennedy: "The new definition
makes our law conform to the United Nations Convention and Protocol").
63 S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
64 Refugee Act of 1979: Hearingson H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees,
and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 House Hearings]; see also id. at 43, 168, 169, 248, 251, 280, 284, 291, 357, 361, 383, 393.
"1 1979 House Hearings, supra note 55, at 169, 284; Briefing on the Growing Refugee Problem,
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizationsof the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979).
6 H.R. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
6' See, e.g., In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542 (1980), rev'd, McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d
1312 (9th Cir. 1981). While Stevic was pending, the Board announced a new hybrid formulation by
which to test an applicant's claim for refuge. In re Portales, 18 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241 (1982) ("an
alien must demonstrate a clear probability that he will be persecuted if returned to his country or a
well-founded fear of such persecution").
" McMullen, 658 F.2d 1312.
60
61
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claimed that he was likely to be persecuted upon return to Ireland. The applicant
presented confirming documentary evidence of his defection from the PIRA, and
the PIRA's nature and activities. The denial was based on the ground that under
the "clear probability" standard the alien had not demonstrated that the Irish
government could not control the PIRA. The court of appeals reversed the Board's
holding, explaining that the standard applied would be virtually impossible to
satisfy.69

In a more recent case, the Board denied withholding to a Mexican national
who had been involved in a student political organization, a member of which had
been killed. Additionally, the alien had been linked by the Mexican government
to the killing, and three expert witnesses testified in support of his claim to a well
founded fear of persecution on return to Mexico."
IV. ANALYsIs
Given the adherence of the Board to the prior withholding standard, it was
inevitable that the issue in Stevic-whether the Refugee Act of 1980 had relaxed
the "clear probability" standard of proof through the adoption of the refugee definition and the "well founded fear" criterion-would reach the United States Supreme
Court.
A.

The Stevic Rationale

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Court held in Stevic
that the refugee standard-"well-founded fear of persecution"-did not apply to
the immigration remedy of withholding of deportation. 7 ' Rather, the Court ruled
that the prior administrative "clear probability'" 2 standard applied. 7 This result
was compelled, according to the Court, by the language of the statute and the
legislative history.
The Court began with an analysis of the language of the withholding statute:
[T]he text of the statute simply does not specify how great a possibility of persecution must exist to qualify the alien for withholding of deportation. To the extent
such a standard can be inferred from the bare language of the provision, it appears
74
that a likelihood of persecution is required.

69 Id.
70

Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).

7'Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2490.
72 A "clear probability"
requires a finding of "whether it is more likely than not that the alien
would be subject to persecution." Id. at 2498.
7

Id.

" Id. at 2497 (footnote omitted).
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The Court found persuasive the facts that the section provided literally for
withholding of deportation only if the alien's life or freedom "would" (not "might"
or "could") be threatened in the home country, and that the withholding provi5
sion, both prior to and after amendment, made no mention of the term "refugee".
The Court distinguished the withholding provision from "discretionary grants
of refugee admission or asylum," which incorporate the refugee definition and the
well-founded fear of persecution standard. 76 While expressly eschewing the opportunity to discuss the meaning of the well-founded fear standard, the Court
characterized as a "moderate position" the notion "that so long as an objective
situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation
will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable
77
possibility."
The Court found its analysis consistent with the Refugee Act which was designed
"to eliminate the piecemeal approach to admission of refugees previously existing
. . . and to establish a systematic scheme for admission and resettlement of
refugees." 71 As to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 7 9 the Court noted
that it did not require admission at all, nor did it preclude a signatory from exercising judgment among classes of refugees within the refugee definition in determining whom to admit.8" The Court elaborated:
[T]o the extent that domestic law was more generous than the Protocol, the Attorney
General would not alter existing practice; to the extent that the Protocol was more
generous than the bare text of § 243(h) would necessarily require, the Attorney
General would honor the requirements of the Protocol and hence there was no
need for modifying the language of § 243(h) itself.8'
Despite the wide-ranging analysis, the Court's holding itself was quite narrow:
We have deliberately avoided any attempt to state the governing standard beyond
noting that it requires that an application be supported by evidence establishing
that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution on
one of the specified grounds. This standard is a familiar one to immigration
authorities and reviewing courts, and Congress did not intend to alter it in 1980.

11Id. Of course, a different result could have been justified by focusing on the term "threatened,"
which also appears in the provision, as indicative of the fact that it would be necessary to show but
a "reasonable possibility" that the alien would be persecuted upon return to the home country, a standard suggested by Justice Stevens in the asylum context, in order to qualify for withholding of deportation. Sometimes the "plain meaning" of statutory language is in the eye of the beholder.
76 Id. at 2499.

';
"

Id. at 2498.
Id. at 2498-99.
See Protocol, supra note 32.
Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2499-2500 n.22.
Id. at 2500-01 (footnote omitted).
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.. . We do not decide the meaning of the phrase "well-founded fear of persecution" which is applicable by the terms of the Act and regulations to requests for
discretionary asylum. That issue is not presented by this case."

The narrowness of the Court's holding surprised both the parties and
knowledgeable observers. The narrow holding has reserved for furture decision a
number of issues, including the meaning of the well-founded fear standard.
The impact of the Stevic decision will also be quite narrow, because all aliens
can apply for asylum in addition to withholding of deportation and thereby take
advantage of the possibly more liberal asylum standard. 3 Advocates are therefore
likely to apply for both asylum and withholding, and will argue that the evidence
shows persecution is more likely than not and, a fortiori, that there is a "reasonable
possibility" of persecution.
Only those aliens who were denied asylum on grounds other than the fact that
they could not show a well-founded fear of persecution would be affected. This
might occur because they were firmly resettled in a third country and are thereby
ineligible for asylum,"' or because they are denied asylum as a matter of discretion."
Only a few asylum seekers would fall into these categories.
Of course, by emphasizing the distinction between discretionary asylum and
mandatory withholding of deportation, Stevic invites an increasing role for discretion in asylum adjudications. Until now, discretion has played a rather circumscribed
role. 86 There are, however, indications that the Board may be prepared to endorse
a broader role for discretion." An expansion of the exception, however, ultimately
could serve to swallow the right to seek asylum.
B.

The Meaning of Well-Founded Fear

The Court in Stevic declined to discuss the importance of the well-founded
fear standard and expressly reserved that issue for another day. This subject will
undoubtedly become the focus of administrative and judicial litigation. The "wellfounded fear" standard, in contrast to the "clear probability" standard, introduces
as a factor in the inquiry the character and state of mind of the individual applicant."

11Id. at 2501.
,3 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-30 (1982) (withholding available in exclusion proceedings); 8 U.S.C. § 1251-60
(1982) (withholding available in deportation proceedings); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1984); In re Matelot,
18 I. & N. Dec. 334 (1982).
8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(ii) (1984).
In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982).
" Id. (in which asylum was denied to an Afghan who had intentionally circumvented the U.S.
overseas refugee admission program in Pakistan).
" See, e.g., In re McMullen, 1984 Int. Dec. No. 2967 (May 25, 1984) at 13 (asylum denied in
the exercise of "discretion" because of "serious adverse factor of alien's involvement in the PIRA's
random violence directed against innocent civilians").

11See HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss4/6
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The Court also did not refer to the Handbook on Proceduresand Criteriafor
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 9 The Second Circuit, however, had characterized
the Handbook as a distillation of the "High Commissioner's 25 years of experience,
the practices of governments acceding to the Protocol and literature on the
subject." 9 The Board of Immigration Appeals has treated the Handbook as a significant source of guidance to the meaning of the Protocol." Courts have also recognized its authoritative character.92
According to the Handbook, fear must be reasonable under the circumstances,
or as Justice Stevens explained it in Stevic, there must be a "reasonable possibility"
of persecution. Generally, a claimant's fear will have external indicia. Under the
Protocol standard, circumstantial evidence is relevant and admissible, and is to
be evaluated in terms of "the personal and family background of the applicant,
his membership of a particular racial, religious, national, social or political group,
' 93
his own interpretationof his situation, and his personal experiences.
Thus, under the "well-founded fear" standard, the determination of refugee
status will "primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather
than a judgment of the situation prevailing in his country of origin." 9 The conditions in the country in question, however, may be relevant as external confirming
evidence of the applicant's fear.
As the post-1980 asylum cases reach the courts, the precise content of the refugee
definition will become an issue of increasing importance. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Stevic decision is what it did not decide: the meaning of wellfounded fear.

V. THE

RESPONSE OF THE BOARD

In a recent case the Board of Immigration Appeals discussed the impact of
Stevic on the standards of proof required in asylum and withholding of deportation cases. 95 Recognizing that the federal courts have split on the issue, 9 the Board
held that the asylum and withholding standards are congruent.
1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

11-13,

37-41,

45 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HANBOOK].
:9 Id.
0 Sava, 678 F,2d at 406.

9'In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (1982); In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465 (1980).
92 Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, n.7 (9th Cir. 1984); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union,
Local 25 v. William French Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502, 512 (D.D.C. 1984).
11HANDBOOK, supra note 88, at 12,
41 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 11,
37.
11In re Acosta-Solorzano, Int. Dec. No. 2986, slip op. (BIA March 1, 1985). Prior to the decision in Acosta-Solorzano, the Board had cited Stevic in over 100 unpublished decisions without differentiating between the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation. Research memorandum
in author's files.

11Id. at 3.
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As we construe them, both the well-founded-fear standard for asylum and the clearprobability standard for withholding of deportation require an alien's facts to show
that the alien possesses a characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome by punishing
the individuals who possess it, that a persecutor is aware or could easily become
aware that the alien possesses this characteristic, that a persecutor has the capacity
of punishing the alien, and that a persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien.

Accordingly, withholding of deportation are not meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge.

7

It found that formulations of the asylum standard such as "good reason" or "valid
reason" to fear persecution "do not adequately describe the well-founded fear
standard.""

VI.

THE RESPONSE OF THE COURTS

Several courts have also had occasion to respond to the Stevic decision.99 Circuit courts have addressed both the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear"
standards. Unfortunately, they do not agree as to the amount and nature of proof
needed to meet each standard, or even the application of the standards. There is
a continuing split in the circuits regarding the standards, with the Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits lining up together, and with the Third Circuit in opposition.100
The Third Circuit stands alone in its post-Stevic contention that there is no
difference between the two standards. In Sotto v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, ' the court restated its holding from Rejaie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service' that the withholding and asylum claims are equivalent:
", Id. at 19-20. The Immigration and Naturalization Service apparently is considering the issuance
of regulations which adopt the approach in Acosta-Solorzano by equating the asylum and withholding
standards. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1985, A, at 28, col. 1.
1, Acosta-Solorzano, at 18. The Board did recognize, however, that an alien's testimony should
not be rejected "solely because it is self-service." Id. at 6.
19The circuits are also split on a related issue-the appropriate standard of judicial review of
administrative action in asylum cases. The Third Circuit has held that the abuse of discretion standard
is appropriate. Marroquin-Manriquez,699 F.2d at 133 n.5. The Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
however, have held that the refugee status determination should be supported by substantial evidence.
Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, No. 83-7916; slip op. (9th Cir. March 8, 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,
749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1984); Yiu Sing
Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1983); Sarkis v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. 235, 237, 238 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
1o0Sotto v INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Sankar v. INS, No. 84-3341, slip op. (3d
Cir. Jan. 29, 1985).
Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
"z Sotto, 748 F.2d at 832. The issue was not necessary to the resolution of Sotto, which involved
a citizen of the Philippines who claimed that he had been harassed and intimidated for political reasons.
Despite the strict standard applied, the Third Circuit remanded the case so that a corroborative affidavit could be considered by the administrative authorities. The affidavit, written by a former general
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Although that issue remains open in the Supreme Court, it is not open in this court.
In Rejaie, which for all practical purposes involved both a claim for withholding
of deportation and an application for asylum, we held that "there is no difference"
between the two standards, and that a "well-founded fear" ... equates with "clear
probability". . . . We read nothing in Stevic to undermine the Rejaie holding.
Since a request to withhold deportation is frequently joined with a request for asylum
in the context of deportation proceedings, it is fitting to apply congruent standards."'
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, however, differentiate between the
"well-founded fear" and "clear probability" standards.
The Sixth Circuit in Youkhanna v. Immigration and NaturalizationService has

differentiated the standards by holding that review of a request for asylum requires
a separate analysis.'

The court noted that the "well-founded fear" standard

required a lesser showing than the "clear probability" standard, but found that
neither standard had been satisfied in that case.
However, the difference between the two standards has not been explained in
terms of the evidence required to support either claim. The Sixth Circuit has indicated that "objective" evidence is needed to meet both standards. In Dally v.

Immigration and NaturalizationService,"05 the court denied applications for asylum
and withholding of deportation by several Iraqi nationals who claimed that they
faced persecution, harassment, and detention upon return to Iraq as Chaldean
Catholics.' 6 The Sixth Circuit resolved the asylum and withholding issues together
without differentiation, explaining:
As we read Stevic and the earlier cases dealing with deportation, we conclude that
the "clear probability" test requires at least that an alien show that it is more likely
than not that he as an individual will be subject to persecution if forced to return
to his native land. A "clear probability" of persecution cannot be proven by the
introduction of documentary evidence, not pertaining to the applicant individually,
that depicts a general lack of freedom or the probability of human rights abuses
in the alien's native land." 7
In view of the absence of "objective"

evidence, the court felt compelled to reject

the claims. Acknowledging the seriousness of the allegation, the court nonetheless

and Philippine Assemblyman, stated that Sotto was wanted in the Philippines because of political activities, that Sotto's father had been persecuted and tortured in his stead, and opined that Sotto would
be imprisoned and mistreated upon return to the Philippines.
,0 Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984).
104 Ia. at 362.
,05 Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1984).
106 Id.

1*,Id. at 1195. See also Shamon v. INS, 735 F.2d 1015 (6th Cir. 1984) (decided after but not
mentioning Stevic), Reyes v. INS, 747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984). Cf. Lemus v. INS, 741 F.2d 765
(5th Cir. 1984); Perwolf v. INS, 741 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1984).
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stated that the immigration laws did not permit relief "based on a petitioner's selfserving statements."'108
Dally was cited by the Sixth Circuit in Nasser v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,' 9 where asylum and withholding claims by an Iraqi national were
rejected despite testimony by the alien of his imprisonment on several occasions,
a beating by Baath officials, and the killing of his father by such a beating.'
The court noted that "[olutside of these subjective claims, no other evidence or
affidavits were introduced which corroborated any of Nasser's individualized
claims.""I'
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's reticence on the issue, the Seventh Circuit
has addressed the difference in the evidence required for asylum and withholding

of deportation. The elaborate discussion in Carvajal-Munoz v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service" 2 indicates that the "clear probability" standard requires
objective evidence to corroborate the applicant's testimony, while "sometimes" the
applicant's testimony alone will be sufficient to meet the "well-founded fear"
standard.
Carvajal involved a man who was a native of Chile and a former citizen of
Argentina. He claimed he would be persecuted upon his return to Argentina because
of his birth in Chile, his past political activities, and his renunciation of his Argentine citizenship. He testified in particular that he had been harassed and detained
previously in Argentina.1' 3 Citing a prior decision," 4 the Seventh Circuit noted that
under the "clear probability" standard, held applicable to withholding of deportation in Stevic, "objective evidence that the alien will be persecuted is necessary.
The alien's own assertions, without corroboration, will not suffice."'" The court
further explained that it recognized the burden was not an easy one. However the
court maintained (1) that the applicant must provide specific facts regarding his
or her conduct and contentions; (2) that statements of the applicant's belief were
insufficient; and (3) that the evidence must establish the particular applicant would
"more likely than not" be singled out for persecution. ' 6
,0,Id. at 1194.

Nasser v. INS, 744 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 545.

Id.
,, Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 562.
"'
Id. at 563.
", Kashani, 547 F.2d 376.

Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 573 (citing and quoting Kashani, 547 F.2d 376).
The Seventh Circuit explained that "[tihis view [differentiating the two standards] comports
well with the structure of the Immigration Act: establishing an entitlement to withholding of deportation under section 243(h) should require a greater evidentiary burden than establishing 'refugee' status
so as to be eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum under section 208." Id. at 575. On the other
hand, it might appear to be anomalous to require a greater showing in order to achieve the lesser status
of temporary withholding of deportation from a specific country.
"'

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss4/6

18

Helton: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic: Standards of Pr
1985]

POLITICAL ASYLUM

Again citing its prior decision, the Seventh Circuit differentiated the "clear
probability" withholding standard from the less stringent "well-founded fear"
asylum test." 7 As to the latter test, it explained:
The applicant must present specific facts establishing that he or she has actually
been the victim of persecution or has some other good reason to fear that he or
she will be singled out for persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Ordinarily, this must
be done through objective evidence supporting the applicant's contentions.
Sometimes, however, the applicant's own testimony will be all that is available regarding past persecution or the reasonable possibility of persecution. In these situations, the applicant's uncorroborated testimony will be insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden unless it is credible, persuasive, and points to specific facts that give
rise to an inference that the applicant has been or has a good reason to fear that
he or she will be singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds, or
.. . must show through testimony and corroborative objective evidence that he

or she has good reason to fear persecution on one of the specified grounds."'
The Seventh Circuit in Carvajal-Munozconcluded, however, that the alien had
satisfied neither burden." 9
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed Stevic in Bolanos-Hernandez,'2 which
involved the review of a denial of withholding and asylum to a Salvadoran national
who had reported a specific death threat by the guerrillas as a result of his refusal
to join them. The court stated that the difference in language between section 243(h),
withholding of deportation, and section 208(a), asylum, supported their conclusion
2
that the asylum standard was more liberal.' '
"I Id. at 572-575. The Seventh Circuit noted that while it had predicted that the two standards
"will in practice converge," that "was only a prediction made before the passage of the Refugee Act
and does not express our view of the effect of that statute." Id. at 574.
Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
", In view of the difference in the nature and scope of review, the court suggested that in the
future immigration judges "make asylum decision, whenever possible, on a separate record and before
the deportation hearing itself, and not along with a withholding of deportation decision, which is to
take place after deportability has been determined and a country of deportation designated." Id. at 570.
Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1316. See also Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, No. 83-7916, slip
op. (9th Cir. March 8, 1985) (necessary for alien to introduce some specific evidence to show that
persecution would be directed to him as an individual); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1984) (not necessary for court to "determine the proper standard of proof necessary to make a
prima facie showing of a "well-founded fear of persecution" because of administrative finding that
alien's testimony not "credible.")
121 Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1321. The court also suggested a procedure for reviewing the
administration determinations.
When the Board his disposed of the ... [asylum and withholding] claims in this combined
fashion, we believe the proper approach for the reviewing court is first to consider the section
243(h) claim under the more stringent clear-probability standard. Then, if it concludes that
the alien's 243(h) petition was properly denied, it should review the 208(a) claim under the
more generous well-founded fear standard. However, if the court concludes that the alien
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The Ninth Circuit found both asylum and withholding warranted in this case,
without finding corroborative testimony necessary:
We recognize that omitting a corroboration requirement may invite those whose

lives or freedom are not threatened to manufacture evidence of specific danger.
But the imposition of such a requirement would result in the deportation of many
people whose lives genuinely are in jeopardy. Authentic refugees rarely are able
to offer direct corroboration of specific threats .... Persecutors are hardly likely
to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution., 22

The court noted that if an alien's own testimony about a threat, when "unrefuted
and credible," was insufficient to establish the fact that the threat was made, it
would be "close to impossible [for any political refugee] to make out a Sec. 243(h)
23
case. " ,
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the role of documentary evidence, stating
that because the mere fact a threat was made could be insufficient to establish
a clear probability of persecution, substantiation of the threat's seriousness was
important. "What matters is whether the group making the threat has the will or
the ability to carry it out. It is here that general corroborative evidence, such as
documentary evidence, may be most useful."' 2" The court found the threat reported
by Mr. Bolanos-Hernandez to be a serious one supported by general documentary
evidence, and ruled that withholding and asylum were warranted. 12'
Even prior to the decision in Bolanos-Hernandez,the Ninth Circuit had discussed
the evidence needed to prove eligibility for asylum when it reversed a Board of
Immigration denial of asylum in Zavala-Bonilla v. Immigration andNaturalization
Service.'2 6 In Zavala-Bonilla, the asylum applicant was an active, high-level trade
union member in El Salvador, who was known to the Salvadoran authorities. After
coming to the United States, Ms. Zavala-Bonilla applied for political asylum and
supported her application with four letters from friends in El Salvador, a letter
from her union, and numerous press and international organization accounts of
oppressive conditions in El Salvador. The State Department issued a positive advisory opinion. The Board of Immigration Appeals, however, concluded that the
asylum claim was deficient because it was not supported by "objective evidence.""'
met the clear probability standard, it need go no farther since the well-founded fear standard
will, a fortiori, also have been met.
Id. at 1322.
,22 Id. at 1324 [citations omitted].
Id. at 1324 (citing and quoting McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1319).
124 Id. at 1324.
," Id. at 1326. The court also determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals had erred "as
a matter of law" in concluding that "specific threats are insufficient to establish a threat of persecution
if they are representative of a general level of violence in a foreign country," and that "neutrality
does not constitute a political opinion." Id. at 1328.
' ' Zavala-Bonilla, 730 F.2d 562. See also Soto, 748 F.2d 832.
Zz

Zavala-Bonilla, 730 F.2d at 563.
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The Board had "denigrated" the letters as "gratuitous speculations." The court,

however, disagreed: "[I]t is difficult to imagine, given her circumstances, what other
forms of testimony Zavala-Bonilla could readily present."'

28

The court remanded

the matter directing the Board to "fully consider the letters." 1 9
The decisions of the Ninth Circuit in Zavala-Bonilla and Bolanos-Hernandez
take a common sense approach. In the asylum context, it is important to distinguish

between the individual's subjective state of mind and so-called "objective" evidence.
A fear of persecution may well be confirmed by external actions and behavior on
the part of the applicant for asylum and others. Such "objective" evidence may
be established through the testimony of the asylum applicant, or it may be cor-

roborated by the testimony of others or by circumstantial evidence.
The question is what evidence reasonably can be expected to be available.
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If it is reasonable under the circumstances to expect that only the testimony of

the applicant would be forthcoming, then that testimony should be sufficient to
establish the claim, assuming that it is facially plausible.,3 ' If it were reasonable

to anticipate corroboration (for example, a diplomatic passport held by a former
embassy official stationed abroad at the time of a change of government), then

its unexplained absence would be significant. These are the kinds of issues factfinders face constantly in other contexts. As immigration asylum officers and judges
become more familiar with these principles, the quality of decision-making should
be enhanced.' 32
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I at 565.
Id.
Id. at 567.

"3 The Immigration and Naturalization Service has taken a similar position in the context of written
guidelines for those who are to adjudicate overseas refugee applications under the same legal standards.
A statement by the applicant must not be disregarded solely because it is self-serving in that
it supports his own claim. Testimony by the applicant is frequently all that is available, and
if that testimony is credible, it is sufficient to establish a claim to refugee status. An overall
assessment of credibility should be made by the adjudicator, in which the interest of the
testifying party in the outcome of the case is one factor to be considered. Other factors to
be considered are: (1) the demeanor of the applicant; (2) the knowledge which the adjudicator
possesses, from the State Department or from other sources, regarding conditions in the applicant's country and whether the applicant's account is supported by, consistent or inconsistent with, that knowledge; (3) whether any lack of corroborating documentary evidence or
witnesses is reasonable under all the circumstances of the case; and (4) the internal consistency
of the applicant's account. In close cases, where the applicant's account appears to be credible,
but the adjudicator is unsure as to whether a valid claim to refugee status has been established,
the adjudicator may grant the claim, if the account is believable in light of the officer's
knowledge of country conditions.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES FOR OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROCESS-

ING 21, 22 (1983).
' See HANDBOOK, supra note 88, at 48,
203, 204.
"
While it is beyond the scope of this article, aspects of international law can also provide sources
of interpretation for the meaning and application of the refugee standard. See, e.g., Rodriquez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981). References could include the intent of the drafters
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and current state practice. The United Nations
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CONCLUSION

By differentiating the standard of proof in withholding of deportation cases
from the refugee standard in asylum cases the Supreme Court has acted contrary
to a general object of the Refugee Act-to unify standards and procedures in the
area.' 33 Stevic reintroduces complications in an area which Congress sought to
regularize through the enactment of the Refugee Act. The Stevic decision would
seem to invite legislation specifically stating that the refugee definition applies to
individuals seeking withholding as well as to those seeking asylum in order to achieve
the uniformity sought by Congress in the Refugee Act.
Such legislation would accord with the obligations of the United States under
the United Nations Protocol. Under the Court's analysis in Stevic, a person who
meets the definition of refugee under the Protocol could be deported to face persecution in violation of Article 33. '1' While any such action would presumably constitute
an abuse of discretion under Stevic, there is reason to foreclose any ambiguity and
make it clear that the refugee standard of well-founded fear of persecution applies.
Such legislative change will not solve all the problems. The circuit courts do
not agree on the meaning of "well-founded fear," nor do they agree on the quantum and nature of evidence necessary to satisfy that standard. So long as the circuits remain split on the refugee standard, basic questions about its application
in the asylum context will remain open. It is likely that the Supreme Court will
soon need to reexamine these issues.
High Commissioner for -Refugees, that entity which is responsible for the interpretation and supervision
of the application of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol, has taken the position that the
drafters' unambiguous inent was that the term "well-founded fear of being persecuted" in the 1951
Convention means that in order for a person to qualify for refugee status it must be shown that his
subjective fear of persecution is based upon "objective" facts which make the fear reasonable under
the circumstances, but not necessarily that he would be more likely than not to become the victim
of persecution. (Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent, INS v. Stevic, No. 82-973). As to the latter, translation and nuance
of language sometimes tend to obscure the comparison. In certain instances, however, guidance is possible.
See, e.g., Khera and Khawaja [1983] 2 W.L.R. 321, in which the House of Lords, according to the
Immigration Appeal Tribunal in 1984 in Enninful and Secretary (3423), indicated that it is not necessary
for a person applying for asylum to prove that on the balance of probabilities he would be persecuted,
but rather that it is sufficient to show that th fear of persecution is well-founded, even though the
person faces a less than even chance of persecution.
In THE REFUGEE IN INTERNAIONAL LAW (Oxford 1983), Guy S. Goodwin-Gill points out that
a balance of probabilities standard fails to recognize that a refugee is involved in an effort to predict
future occurrences upon return to his or her home country. He cites Fernandez v. Government of
Singapore, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 987, an opinion of the House of Lords in an extraadition case. In that
case, Lord Diplock concluded that the individual need not show that it was more likely than not that
he-would be detained if returned to the requesting country, but that a lessor degree of likelihood sufficed
such as "a reasonable chance," "substantial grounds for thinking," or "a serious possibility." GoodwinGill argues that a refugee should be accorded no less benevolent a standard. Id. at 24.
"I' See Yiu Sing Chun, 708 F.2d 869 (stowaway held entitled to evidentiary hearing on asylum
claim even though a hearing is otherwise precluded by exclusion statute).
"1 104 S. Ct. at 2500-01, n.22.
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